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Abstract 
 
Assessment of software COTS components is an 
essential part of component-based software 
development. Sub-optimal selection of components 
may lead to solutions with low quality. The assessment 
is based on incomplete knowledge about the COTS 
components themselves and other aspects, which may 
affect the choice such as the vendor’s credentials, etc. 
We argue in favor of assessment methods in which 
uncertainty is explicitly represented (‘uncertainty 
explicit’ methods) using probability distributions. We 
have adapted a model (developed elsewhere [17]) for 
assessment of a pair of COTS components to take 
account of the fault (bug) logs that might be available 
for the COTS components being assessed. We also 
provide empirical data from a study we have 
conducted with off-the-shelf database servers, which 
illustrate the use of the method.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components often 
form an essential part in software development. 
Benefits of their use are wide ranging: from the 
incentive to cut-down on cost to reducing the 
development time and improving quality by using tried 
and tested components. An initial and essential part of 
component based software development is the 
assessment of available COTS components. There exist 
a plethora of available methods for COTS assessment 
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], 
[13], [14]. An often overlooked aspect in the existing 
assessment techniques is the inherent uncertainty in the 
values of the parameters being assessed. This is 
because the assessment is carried out with limited 
resources of time and budget. Therefore the true values 
of the assessed attributes will rarely be known with 
certainty. 
For solutions with very stringent dependability 
requirements a single component may rarely be able to 
meet the required dependability target. It has been 
argued [15] that employing fault-tolerance in the form 
of software design diversity (i.e. using more than one 
component to perform the same function) is usually the 
best guarantee of achieving higher levels of 
dependability than what the available COTS 
components can offer. But, employing software 
diversity was seen in the past as an expensive method 
for increasing dependability due to the need of building 
more than one component. With off-the-shelf 
components this problem is overcome: there may be 
many different components that will have the required 
functionality therefore bespoke development may not 
be required
1
. Moreover many of these components are 
free and open-source, thus the cost of procurement may 
be non-existent. The problem of assessment though still 
exists. If we were interested in building a 1-out-of-2
2
 
system, simply choosing the two best components that 
exist in the market may not be enough. What is of 
interest is how well the pair works together. The 
optimal pair will be the one with the lowest probability 
of coincident failures of both components of the pair. 
The components that form the best pair may not 
necessarily be the ones which are the best individually. 
For further details on the subtleties of this problem the 
interested reader is referred to a recent survey [16]. 
In this paper we will provide details of an adaptation 
of the model in [17] which allows for an optimal 
selection of a pair of components to be used in a fault-
                                                           
1 Apart from ‘glue code’ (usually referred to as middleware) 
which may be needed to ensure the components can be 
deployed for a given system in a coordinated manner as 
required by the particular system context. 
2 In this configuration the system performs correctly as long 
as 1 of the 2 components works correctly. 
tolerant system. In this model the assessment results are 
subject to uncertainty and we discuss how this may 
impact the decisions about which pair of components 
we choose. The model also enables representing the 
dependencies that exists between uncertainties 
associated with the values of each COTS component in 
the pair. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 
contains a brief review of related work on COTS 
assessment; in section 3 we describe the model of 
assessment, in which model parameters are not known 
with certainty and argue in favor of using probability 
distributions as an adequate mechanism to capture this 
uncertainty; in section 4 we provide details of an 
empirical study with off-the-shelf database servers and 
illustrate how our approach can be used to select the 
optimal diverse pair; in section 5 we provide a 
discussion of the method and finally section 6 contains 
conclusions and provisions for further work. 
 
2. Related work  
 
There are a wide variety of COTS assessment 
approaches available. All of them start with an initial 
statement of requirements, which defines what is being 
sought. It has been proposed that the requirements 
initially should not be too stringent, since this would 
discard potentially appropriate COTS candidates at a 
very early stage [9], [18]. It has even been suggested 
[18] that if the requirements are not flexible then the 
COTS based development may not be appropriate and 
bespoke development could be more cost-effective. So 
initially [18] suggests distinguishing between essential 
requirement and those that are negotiable. The 
selection criteria are then based on the essential 
requirements. 
Off-the-shelf-option (OTSO) [2] is a multi-phase 
approach to COTS selection. The phases are: the 
search phase, the screening and evaluation phase and 
the analysis phase. In the first phase COTS products 
are identified. In the screening and evaluation phase the 
products are further filtered using a set of evaluation 
criteria (established from a number of sources, 
including the requirements specification, the high level 
design specification etc). In the analysis phase results 
of the evaluation are analyzed, which lead to the final 
selection of COTS products for inclusion in the system. 
Procurement-oriented requirements engineering 
(PORE) [1] is a process in which requirements are 
defined in parallel with COTS component evaluation 
and selection. [1] propose using prototypes to develop 
knowledge concerning COTS products and their use 
within the wider system. 
Other assessment methods include: CISD (COTS-based 
Integrated System Development) [4], STACE (Socio 
Technical Approach to COTS Evaluation) [10], 
CDSEM (Checklist Driven Software Evaluation 
Methodology) [3], CRE-COTS-Based Requirements 
Engineering Method [6], CEP (Comparative 
Evaluation Process Activities) [7], CBA Process 
Decision Framework [8], A Proactive Evaluation 
Technique [19], CAP-COTS Acquisition Process 
method [5],  Storyboard Process [11], Combined 
Selection of COTS Components [12], PECA Process 
[13] or COTS-DSS [14]. 
 
3. Assessment of Diverse COTS Solutions: 
Bayesian Approach 
 
3.1 Uncertainty in the assessment 
 
Any assessment is conducted with limited resources 
and under various assumptions, which may not hold 
true in real operation. Therefore the outcome of the 
assessment is subject to uncertainty. For example, 
deciding to rate a COTS component exactly 7 out of 10 
according to a chosen scale may be difficult to justify. 
The assessor may be certain that the values of the 
attribute outside the range {6,7} are unreasonable but 
be indifferent between the possible values inside this 
interval. Software reliability is a typical example of an 
attribute which is never known with certainty. 
Probability of failure on a randomly chosen demand 
(pfd) is unknown, but the assessor may be prepared to 
state, with confidence 99%, that it is less than, say 10
-3
. 
The assessor may be even more specific of their doubts 
about the COTS pfd and state that the most likely range 
of the pfd is between 10
-4
 and 10
-3
.  
There are various methods for representing 
uncertainty [20]. Bayesian approach to probabilistic 
modeling is one of the best-known ones and used with 
some success in reliability assessment [21]. It allows 
one to combine, in a mathematically sound way, the 
prior belief (which is ‘subjective’ and possibly 
inaccurate) about the values of a parameter with the 
(‘objective’) evidence from seeing the modeled artifact 
(in this case a COTS component) in operation. 
Combining the prior belief and the evidence from the 
observations in a mathematically correct way leads to a 
posterior belief about the values of the assessed 
attribute. If the prior belief is represented as a 
probability distribution rather than a single value, then 
after seeing the observations we get a posterior 
distribution (quantification of uncertainty) which takes 
into account both the prior knowledge and the 
empirical evidence. 
3.2 Model for Assessment of 1 COTS 
Component with one Attribute 
 
In this section we illustrate how the Bayesian 
approach to assessment is normally applied to assessing 
a single attribute of a single COTS component. Assume 
that the attribute of interest is the component’s 
probability of failure on demand (pfd). 
If the system is treated as a black box, i.e. we can 
only distinguish between COTS component’s failures 
or successes (Fig.1), the Bayesian assessment proceeds 
as follows.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Black-box model of a COTS component 
Let us denote the system pfd as p, with prior 
distribution )(•pf , which characterizes the assessor’s 
knowledge about the system pfd prior to observing the 
COTS component in operation. Assume further that the 
COTS component is subjected to n demands, 
independently drawn from a ‘realistic’ operational 
environment (profile), and r failures are observed. The 
posterior distribution, ),|( nrxf p , of p after the 
observations will be: 
)()|,(),|( xfxrnLnrxf pp ∝           (1) 
where )|,( xrnL  is the likelihood of observing r 
failures in n demands if the pfd were exactly x, which in 
this case of independent demands is given by the 
binomial distribution: 
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For any prior and any observation (r, n), including 
(r=0), the posterior can be calculated. Thus it can be 
applied to all the COTS components included in the 
assessment. Now, the selection can be based on the 
posterior distribution derived for the COTS 
components using different criteria: 
- for a given reliability target the COTS component 
chosen will be the one which has the highest 
probability of having a pfd lower than the given 
target; 
- for a predefined ‘mission’ of say, 1000 demands, 
the COTS component chosen will be the one which 
is most likely to survive the mission without a 
failure. 
 
3.3 Model for Assessment of a Fault-Tolerant 
System Consisting of 2 COTS Components 
 
The Bayesian assessment can also be applied to 
choosing a pair of components. In what follows we will 
describe how the assessment can be performed for a 
system made up of two components. The mathematical 
details can be found in [17] and Appendix A. 
Let us assume that the attribute of interest is again 
the pfd of the system: that is of simultaneous failure of 
both components. Now assume that the system is 
subjected to a series of independently selected 
demands. On each demand the response received from 
each of the COTS components is characterized as 
correct/incorrect. Since we have two COTS 
components clearly 4 combinations exist, which can be 
observed on a demand, as shown in Table 1. 
The four probabilities given in the last column of 
Table 1 sum to unity (i.e. they sum to 1). So if the last 
three probabilities are 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively then 
the first one 10p  = 1- (0.2 + 0.4 + 0.3) = 0.1. Thus, the 
joint distribution of any three of these probabilities, 
will give an exhaustive description of the COTS pair 
behavior. In statistical terms, the model of the COTS 
component pair has three degrees of freedom. Since we 
have a three variate distribution we need to define three 
prior distributions (not a single one as in the previous 
section): the prior distributions for the pfd of each of 
the components, and then the conditional prior 
distribution for the pfd of both components 
simultaneously. The details of this joint distribution are 
given in [17, section 2] and Appendix A. From this 
distribution we can then derive the marginal 
distribution of common failures which will be used to 
choose the best pair of components in a 1-out-of-2 
setup. 
 
3.4 Utilizing Multiple Sources of Data in the 
Assessment 
 
In some areas of software engineering, especially in 
testing, the usefulness of partitioning the demand 
space has been recognized [22], [23], [24]. The 
Table 1 - The outcomes and their frequency and probabilities for each demand 
Event COTS A Correct COTS B Correct Observations in n demands Probability 
Α No Yes r1 10
p
 
Β Yes No r 2 01
p
 
Γ No No r 3 11
p
 
∆ Yes Yes r 4 00
p
 
 
COTS output 
COTS 
demands  
demand space partitions typically represent different 
types of demands, which may have different likelihoods 
of occurring in realistic environment. Realistic testing, 
thus, would require generating mixes of demands, 
which take into account the likelihood of the types of 
demands. 
In our context, operating in a partitioned demand 
space may imply that the uncertainty associated with 
the attribute of interest may differ among the partitions, 
e.g. as a result of different number of observations 
being made for the different partitions. 
If the demand space is partitioned into M partitions {S1, 
S2, … SM}, then for each of these the assessment will 
be performed as described above, e.g. with two COTS 
components the description provided in section 3.3 will 
apply. As a result M conditional distributions will be 
associated with each pair of COTS components from 
which the conditional uncertainty of interest will be 
expressed, that characterizes the behavior of the 
particular pair of COTS components in the specific 
partition. Finally, in order to compare the competing 
pairs of COTS components the unconditional 
distribution of the probability of joint failure should be 
derived for the particular profile defined over the set of 
partitions, which represents the targeted operational 
environment. In [25] we describe an approach of 
combining the assessment in partitions under the 
assumption of independence of uncertainties across the 
sub-domains. Mathematical details can be found in [25, 
section 3.3] and Appendix B. 
 
4. Empirical Results from a Study with 
Off-The-Shelf Databases 
 
We have reported previously results of a study on 
dependability of off-the-shelf database servers [26]. In 
this paper we will use the data collected in that study to 
demonstrate how the model explained in section 3.3 
can be utilized to perform the selection of the best pair 
of 2 servers. We note that the ideal selection of the best 
pair is to perform statistical testing using the COTS 
products. This, however, is problematic in practice due 
to the lack of suitable middleware
3
 for diverse database 
replication. Database replication is non-trivial as it 
requires synchronizing the operation of the copies 
while serving concurrent clients. Additionally the 
software vendor of the middleware may like to make a 
‘strategic’ choice of an SQL server pair for use in the 
foreseeable future. The application(s), which may be 
                                                           
3 Some rudimentary solutions such as C-JDBC [27] only 
allow for the use of a minimal subset of SQL with diverse 
SQL servers. 
developed by the users of the middleware in the future, 
will be clearly unknown at the time of making the 
selection, therefore performing statistical testing (which 
is crucially dependent on knowing the operational 
profile in the targeted environment) will be impossible.  
Given these difficulties we can use alternative 
options. We will describe in this paper one such option: 
using stressful environments which increase the 
likelihood of failures occurring. After all the fault-
tolerant solution with a pair of servers is intended to 
cope with the difficult situations (demands) where the 
individual channels are deficient. The set of bugs of a 
particular COTS product (in our case SQL server) 
defines one such stressful environment for a server. We 
have collected known bug reports for four SQL servers, 
namely PostgreSQL 7.0, Interbase 6.0, Oracle 8.0.5 
and Microsoft SQL server 7 [26] (for the sake of 
brevity we will use the abbreviations PG, IB, OR and 
MS respectively throughout the rest of the text when 
referring to these servers). The union of the bugs 
reported for all the compared COTS products will form 
a demand space, in which there will be a partition 
stressing each of the products. The logs of the known 
bugs are treated as a sample (without replacement
4
) 
from the corresponding partition (representing the 
server, for which the bug has been reported). We label 
the partitions nameServerS . Partition XS  is called an 
‘own’ partition for server X and a ‘foreign’ partition 
for any other server Y≠X. The servers are then 
compared using the methodology described in sections 
3.3 and 3.4. 
 
4.1 Prior Distributions 
 
The prior distributions used in this study are 
explained next. The joint prior distribution was 
constructed under the assumptions that the respective 
pfds of a server A and a server B are independently 
distributed; in the general case of the failures being 
non-independent events, the conditional distributions of 
the probability of coincident failure are specified for 
every pair of values of the pfds of servers A and B. 
The distributions were assumed to be identical for 
                                                           
4 Strictly, there might be a difference between sampling with 
and without replacement. Our model is based on sampling 
without replacement while the inference procedure described 
in section 3.3 implies sampling with replacement. This is a 
simplification, which in many cases is acceptable (e.g. 
sampling from a large population of units, none of which 
dominates the sampling process, which seems a plausible 
assumption in our case of SQL servers being very complex 
products and likely to contain many unknown bugs). 
each of the four servers across both their ‘own’ and 
‘foreign’ partitions respectively. This assumption was 
made because we did not have reasons to believe 
otherwise. We discuss other options of deriving more 
accurate priors in the Conclusions section. A summary 
of the distributions used is given in Table 2. 
For ‘own’ partitions the prior distributions of pfds of 
both A and B were defined as uniform in the range [L, 
1], where L < 1 accounts for the chance that some of 
the reported bugs might be Heisenbugs
5
 [28], i.e. we 
expect most of the bugs that have been reported for a 
particular server to cause failures when they are run on 
that server (hence the probability of observing an 
incorrect results failure is very close to 1) but, due to 
Heisenbugs, not always so. As a source for L we used 
the study by Chandra and Chen [29]. These authors 
studied the fault reports for three off-the-shelf 
products: MySQL database server, GNOME desktop 
environment and the Apache web-server and reported 
that 5%, 7% and 14%, respectively, of the reported 
bugs were Heisenbugs. Given the variation between the 
products we interpreted these findings by setting L = 1-
(2*0.14), that is twice the highest value of Heisenbugs 
reported, i.e. allowing for even higher proportion of the 
Heisenbugs than recorded in [29]. The prior, thus, is 
expected to be within the range [0.72, 1]. Notice that 
here the prior distribution for incorrect results is being 
defined at a range close to 1 (i.e. high unreliability). 
This is because of the unusual profile of the demands: 
since we are using known bug reports as demands we 
expect most of the bugs to cause failures when we run 
them on the server for which they were reported. 
For ‘foreign’ partitions, however, the prior 
distributions for both pfds of A or B were defined as 
uniform in the range [0, 1]. This is due to the absence 
of any comparative study to guide our expectation 
about the likely value. In passing we note that 
theoretical work such as [30], [31] suggest that diverse 
software versions will tend to fail coincidentally on 
                                                           
5 Gray defines two types of bugs [28]: “Bohrbugs” for bugs 
that appear to be deterministic (they manifest themselves 
each time the bug script is executed); and “Heisenbugs” for 
those that are difficult to reproduce as they only cause 
failures under special conditions (e.g., created by usage 
pattern, other software and internal state) 
‘difficult’ demands. Since all the bugs are ‘difficult’ – 
they are known to be problematic at least for one of the 
servers – we may consider them genuinely difficult, 
hence assume as plausible that the other servers too, are 
likely to fail on them. On the other hand, empirical 
studies such as [32], [33], have shown that significant 
gains can be had via design diversity – hence low 
chances that a particular server will fail on bugs 
reported for other servers are also plausible. In 
summary, we are indifferent between the values of the 
probability that a server will fail from a ‘foreign’ bug.  
All conditional prior distributions for coincident 
failures of the two servers for given values of the 
components’ pfds were defined in the range [0, min 
(value of pfd of A, value of pfd of B)] (since it cannot 
be greater than the probability of either of the two 
individually). This is again due to the rather unique 
profile, under which we apply the inference and the 
lack of comparable studies that would enable us to 
define a more accurate prior, thus ‘indifference’. 
For the comparison we use a distribution defined on 
the partitions which does not favor any of the servers, 
i.e. we assumed that probability of each partition is 
0.25 in the study with 4 servers
6
. 
 
4.2 Observations 
 
The observations using the known bugs of four off-
the-shelf servers are given in Table 3 [26]. Since we 
included 4 servers in our study and we are interested in 
diverse pairs of servers, then we have a total of 6 
different server pairs. We can see that the number of 
bugs collected for each server was different, which 
indicated that the empirical evidence differs between 
the partitions. The reason for this was merely 
differences in the reporting practices operated by the 
vendors of the servers, e.g. unavailability in the public 
domain of fully reproducible bug scripts for the 
                                                           
6 We could use the number of known bugs for each of the 
partition to construct a profile consistent with the 
observations. This is not acceptable for two reasons: i) it will 
favour poor bug reporting practices, an ii) we would have 
used the bugs twice – once in the inference procedure and 
another time in defining the profile, which is theoretically 
unsound. 
Table 2 - The Prior distributions (identical for all four servers) 
Partition Range Distribution 
pfd of server A or B on ‘Own’ partitions 0.72 – 1 Uniform 
pfd of server A or B on ‘Foreign’ partitions 0 – 1 Uniform 
Conditional Distribution of ‘Coincident failures’ in 
both A and B on either partition 
0 – min (value of pfd of A, value of pfd of B) Uniform 
 
commercial servers (especially OR). Therefore, the 
sizes of the samples from the partitions on each server 
are different
7
. Additionally, these servers are not 
functionally identical: they offer different degrees of 
compliance with the SQL standard(s) and even 
proprietary extension to SQL. Bugs affecting one of 
these extensions, thus, literally cannot exist in a server 
that lacks the extension. We called these “dialect-
specific” bugs. Due to this, not all the bugs reported 
for a server can be run on the other servers. Therefore 
the number of ‘foreign’ bug reports varies between the 
servers.  
 
4.3 Posteriors 
 
Table 4 shows the percentiles of the priors and 
posteriors of the probability of a failure of a pair of 
components assuming a 1-out-of-2 setup. The values in 
the cells represent the confidence that the probability of 
                                                           
7  It may seem desirable to have a similar amount of data for 
the different servers, but in reality there are different 
reporting practices for each server. Such differences simply 
translate into different amounts of empirical evidence 
available for the servers, with which our method can cope 
easily. 
a coincident failure of both components of a pair on the 
same randomly chosen demand is no greater than the 
respective confidence level, e.g. for PG & IB the value 
of 0.02 at the 50
th
 percentile can be interpreted as “we 
are 50% confident that the probability of a coincident 
failure of both PG & IB on a randomly chosen demand 
is no greater than 0.02”.  
We can see that universally the best pair across the 
percentiles is the open-source server pair PG & IB. 
There are some interesting remarks to note from the 
results on Table 4, which highlight the value of 
handling the uncertainty explicitly using probability 
distributions, rather than using point estimates of 
attribute values and the value of exploiting the 
dependence in the failure behavior of the servers: 
- It may seem surprising that the best server pair is 
PG & IB given that results in Table 3 show that one 
coincident failure (i.e. r3) was observed for this pair 
and none for the commercial server pair OR & MS. 
But, in Table 3 we also saw that there is a much 
larger number of single channel failures (i.e. r1 and 
r2) observed for the open-source server pair than for 
the commercial server pair which increases our 
confidence of a strong negative correlation in the 
failure behavior of the open-source pair, i.e. we see 
extensive evidence that diversity does work: when 
one of the servers fails the other works correctly. 
No such evidence is available for the commercial 
servers. 
- We cannot make a selection purely on the 50
th
 
percentile of the posterior distribution of the system 
pfd since 3 of the server pairs give identical results. 
Most of the conventional assessment techniques, 
which rely on median values of the assessment 
attributes would have also been unable to provide a 
clear choice. However we can make a selection 
from the 99
th
 percentile of the same setup. 
We have also used the model described in section 
3.1 to calculate the posteriors of single servers (using 
the same prior definitions as for the pairs, the 
observations for each individual server and utilizing the 
Table 3 - The observations for the 6 diverse 
server pairs on the bug reports of the 
different partitions. In the partition column 
the subscript indicates for which server 
these bugs have been reported. N is the 
total number of bugs run and r1, r2 and r3 are 
as defined in Table 1. 
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N r1 r2 r3 
S
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N r1 r2 r3 
PGS  24 21 0 0 PGS  18 0 0 0 
IBS  28 0 23 1 IBS  31 25 0 0 
ORS  3 0 0 0 ORS  4 0 3 0 
PG 
& 
IB 
MSS  9 0 0 0 
IB 
& 
OR 
MSS  10 1 0 0 
PGS  30 27 0 0 PGS  21 0 1 0 
IBS  24 1 0 0 IBS  35 27 0 2 
ORS  4 0 2 1 ORS  4 0 0 0 
PG 
& 
OR 
MSS  7 0 0 0 
IB 
& 
MS 
MSS  12 0 6 1 
PGS  33 28 0 2 PGS  27 0 2 0 
IBS  25 1 2 0 IBS  30 0 2 0 
ORS  3 0 0 0 ORS  4 3 0 0 
PG 
& 
MS 
MSS  18 1 7 5 
OR 
& 
MS 
MSS  12 0 7 0 
Table 4 - The percentiles of the probability 
of system failure for each server pair. 
50
th
 percentile 99
th
 percentile 
Server Pair 
Prior Posterior Prior Posterior 
PG & IB 0.02 0.12 
PG & OR 0.07 0.19 
PG & MS 0.09 0.20 
IB & OR 0.02 0.14 
IB & MS 0.04 0.14 
OR & MS 
0.3 
0.02 
0.61 
0.14 
partitions theory described in section 3.4). The 
posteriors for each server are shown in Table 5. We 
can see that even the worst pair from Table 4 on all 
percentiles performs better than the best single server 
in Table 5. This is hardly surprising given the fact that 
coincident failures are very rare despite the choice of a 
stressful demand profile (known bug reports). We can 
also see that the differences in the pfd values of a single 
server vs. a diverse pair of servers are quite significant. 
The worst performing server pair has a pfd of no 
worse than 0.20 with confidence 99% whereas the best 
performing single server has a pfd of no worse than 
0.32 with the same confidence level. These results 
indicate that the use of a diverse server pair would 
bring significant dependability gains: the best single 
server may fail up to once in 3 demands while the 
worst pair – up to once in 5 demands.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The Bayesian model explained in sections 3.3 and 
3.4 can be used for selection of an optimal pair of 
COTS components, as was illustrated in section 4, 
when the attribute of interest is the probability of 
failure on demand. It is a common practice that COTS 
components are assessed in terms of more than 2 
attributes, usually many more. The obvious question, 
therefore, is whether the proposed ‘uncertainty explicit’ 
assessment ‘scales up’ to: 
- more than one attribute 
- fault-tolerant configurations in which more than two 
COTS components are used (for example, three 
COTS components to enable majority voting on the 
results)  
In both of these cases, the question is how the 
method applies if we have to define multivariate 
distributions. Even though mathematically possible, 
Bayesian inference with multivariate distributions is 
difficult. The difficulty has two aspects: 
- specifying a multivariate prior distribution becomes 
problematic because many non-intuitive 
dependencies between the attributes must be 
defined and justified. 
- manipulating a multivariate distribution is non-
trivial even using the most advanced math/statistical 
tools. Calculating the posterior distribution is 
impracticable with more than 3 variates and without 
simplifying assumptions about the dependencies 
between them. 
For scenarios where the COTS components need to 
be assessed in terms of more than one attribute, to 
partially overcome these difficulties, a ‘divide-and-
conquer’ approach can be employed: first the attributes 
can be grouped into smaller groups so that there are 
dependencies within the groups, which the assessment 
can capture, but the groups are assumed independent 
(i.e. knowing the values of the attributes in one group 
does not change the assessor’s knowledge (belief) 
about the values of the attributes included in the other 
group); then, due to the independence assumption, the 
final distribution is the product of the distributions of 
the individual groups. More details on this approach 
can be found in [25, section 5.1].  
The limitations we outlined in this section are not 
specific to our assessment method; in fact they are 
more serious for the conventional methods in which the 
individual attributes are assessed separately. We have 
shown in [25] that even when the assessment of single 
COTS components is done using just two attributes, 
ignoring the dependence between the values of the 
attributes may lead to wrong decisions: a sub-optimal 
component may wrongfully be chosen as the best one. 
If this could be observed with only two attributes, then 
it is bound to be much more pronounced with more 
than two attributes, where many more dependencies 
may exist between the values of the attributes.   
The “divide and conquer” approach to attributes 
also has its problems. It can only be applied if the 
assessor can justify that assuming a set of independent 
pairs is plausible. Despite this problem, however, using 
small independent groups is still an improvement 
compared with the extreme assumption used implicitly 
in the existing assessment methods surveyed, that all of 
the attributes are independent.  
It is worth pointing out that many of the attributes, 
such as ‘has the required functions’, various forms of 
compliance, e.g. ‘complies with certain standards’, 
‘Backward Compatibility’, etc. [34], do not require any 
uncertainty attached to their values. Assessment with 
respect to such attributes normally leads to a reduction 
of the number of the COTS components (which satisfy 
all these ‘binary’ attributes), for which the more 
thorough assessment with respect to the remaining 
‘non-binary’ attributes can proceed [35]. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Software diversity is a well known and well studied 
subject in the literature [36]. It is recognized that often 
Table 5 - The percentiles of the probability of 
failure on demand for each single server. 
Posteriors PG IB OR MS 
50
th
 percentile 0.41 0.30 0.26 0.30 
99
th
 percentile 0.54 0.43 0.32 0.42 
the only way of obtaining dependability assurances is 
to employ software diversity [15]. With the plethora of 
off-the-shelf components available fault tolerance 
through software diversity becomes a much more 
achievable and affordable solution especially since 
many of the components are open-source and free. The 
important questions for a given project is how much 
dependability gains there will actually be from 
employing diversity, or at least given a set of diverse 
software alternatives which is the best for a given 
application. 
We applied methods of Bayesian assessment 
developed elsewhere [17], [25]. We illustrated how our 
model can be used with the collected evidence to 
perform the assessment and choose the best server pair. 
We then compared the results of the posteriors of 
server pairs with those of single servers and we saw 
that even the worst server pair still performs much 
better than the best single server. This indicates that 
significant dependability gains may be obtained from 
using diverse off-the-shelf database servers. It is also 
interesting to note that in our assessment the best single 
server is a commercial server, namely Oracle, whereas 
the best pair of components is the pair PostgreSQL & 
Interbase both of which are free and open-source 
components.   
The prior definition in Bayesian assessment is 
crucial. In our study we have assumed that prior 
distributions for each component are the same. This 
was due to the unavailability of other known evidence 
that we could use to define more accurate priors. 
However this problem can be remedied by utilizing 
evidence from earlier versions of the servers and then 
doing multiple steps of inference, i.e. if we want to 
perform the assessment with later versions of the 
servers in our study we can use the posteriors from this 
step as priors for the later versions, collect the new 
evidence for the later versions and then use the model 
to derive the posteriors for each. 
Future work that is desirable would be to enable 
effective assessment with a higher number of COTS 
components in a diverse setup (more than two 
components may be desirable in a diverse setup to 
enable majority voting on the results from the 
components). 
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Appendix A – Component-Pair Assessment 
 
Assume that the attribute of interest is the 
probability of failure on demand (pfd). Now assume 
that the system is subjected to a series of independently 
selected demands. On each demand the response 
received from the COTS components is characterized 
as correct/incorrect. But since we have two COTS 
components clearly 4 combinations exist, which can be 
observed on a randomly chosen demand, as shown in 
Table 1 of section 3. 
The four probabilities given in the last column of 
Table 1 sum to unity (i.e. they sum to 1). This 
constraint remains even if we treat the probabilities in 
Table 1 as random variables: their sum will always be 
1. Thus, the joint distribution of any three of these 
probabilities, e.g. ),,(
111001 ,,
•••pppf , gives an 
exhaustive description of the behavior of a COTS 
components pair. In statistical terms, the model has 
three degrees of freedom.  
The probabilities of getting an incorrect response on 
a random demand from COTS A, let’s denote it pA, or 
COTS B, pB, respectively, can be expressed as:  
1110 pppA +=  and 1101 pppB += . 
p11 represents the probability of receiving an 
incorrect response from both the COTS components. 
Hence, a notation pAB ≡ p11 will capture better the 
intuitive meaning of the event it is assigned to. Instead 
of using ),,(
111001 ,,
•••pppf  another distribution, which 
can be derived from it through functional 
transformation, can be used. We 
use ),,(,, •••ABBA pppf . We define the joint prior 
distribution as: 
),,(,, •••ABBA pppf  =   
),|(,| BAppp ppf BAAB •  ),(, ••BA ppf    (3) 
under the assumption that pA and pB are 
independently distributed, i.e.   
),(, ••BA ppf  =  )(•Apf )(•Bpf         (4) 
It can be shown that for a given observation (r1, r2, 
and r3 in N demands) the posterior joint distribution 
can be calculated as: 
is the multinomial likelihood of the observation (N , 
r1, r2, r3). 
The marginal distribution )(•
ABp
f , which is used 
for comparison of the COTS component pairs, can be 
derived from ),,(,, •••ABBA pppf  by integrating out 
pA and pB, i.e. 
 
)(•
ABp
f = BAppp
pp
dpdpf
ABBA
BA
),,(,, •••∫∫  (7) 
 
Appendix B – Partitions Theory 
 
If the demand space is partitioned into M partitions 
{S1, S2, … SM}, then for each of these the assessment 
will be performed as described in section 3.3, e.g. with 
two COTS components the description provided in 
section 3.3 (with details given in Appendix A) will 
apply. As a result M conditional distributions will be 
associated with each pair of COTS components, e.g. 
using two components these can be denoted as 
)|,,(,, ippp Sf ABBA ••• , from which the 
conditional uncertainty )|( ip Sf AB •  will be 
expressed. This distribution characterizes the 
probability of failure, iAB SP | , of both components in 
the specific partition. Finally, in order to compare the 
competing COTS pairs the unconditional distribution 
)(•
ABp
f  should be derived for the particular profile 
defined over the set of partitions, which represents the 
targeted operational environment.  
Let us denote the profile of the targeted environment 
as { ( ) ( )MSPSP ,...,1 }, and assume that these are known 
with certainty. The marginal probability of failure of a 
COTS component pair, according to the formula of full 
probability is: 
( )∑
=
×=
M
i
iiABAB SPSPP
1
|             (8) 
The distribution of this random variable, ABP , 
depends on the joint distribution, 
( )••,...,|,...,| 1 MABAB SPSPf , i.e. of the conditional 
probabilities of failure in sub-domains. In some setups 
it may be plausible to assume that the conditional 
probabilities of failure (in the partitions that is) are 
independently distributed, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( )∏
=
••=••
M
i
SPSPSPSP MABABMABAB
fff
1
|||,...,| ...,..., 11  (9) 
Such an assumption represents the assessor’s belief 
that learning something about the probability of failure, 
iAB SP | , of a particular COTS component pair in 
partition i will not change their belief about the 
probability of failure, jAB SP | , of the same COTS 
component pair in another partition. The assumption is 
consistent with applying inferences to the individual 
partitions, i.e. conditional on the demands coming from 
a particular partition.  
Under (9) the unconditional probability of COTS 
component pair failure (8) can be expressed as a 
convolution of the distributions of the random variables 
( ) ( )iiABw SPSPiP ×= | , i.e.: 
( )iPP wwAB ⊗=                (10) 
The selection of the best COTS component pair, out 
of the available alternatives, then will be based on the 
marginal distributions, )(•w
ABp
f , associated with the 
available COTS component pairs. 
∫∫∫
=
ABBA
ABBA
ABBA
ABBA
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ABBAppp
ppp
dxdydzppprrrNLzyxf
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